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NOTES
struction, the courts have regarded unauthorized administrative
interpretations as invalid.13 The instant case is an illustration
of this principle, but it is believed that since the purpose of the
act is to protect the public the authority to require a bond might
well have been read into the statute.
ROBERT H. WILLIAMS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-WAIVER OF NOTIcE-REQUIRED BY STA-
TUTE-Relators, school bus operators of East Baton Rouge Parish
who had acquired tenure, were given notice to appear before the
school board for a hearing to determine whether they should
be dismissed upon the ground of wilful neglect of duty. On the
day set for the hearing these operators appeared with counsel
in the corridor of the courthouse, adjoining the room in which
the meeting was being held; however, they refused, upon re-
quest, to participate in the proceeding because the statutory re-
quirement that notice be given at least fifteen days in advance
of the hearing had not been complied with by the board. Lou-
isiana Act 185 of 1944 provides "that said School Bus Operator
shall be furnished by such school board at least fifteen days in
advance of said hearing, with a copy of the written grounds on
which removal or discharge is sought."' The relators argued that
the hearing was invalid because they had not received notice at
least fifteen days before the hearing. Held, that the operators'
appearance with counsel in the corridor of the courthouse es-
topped them from contending that notice was not given timely.2
State ex rel. Williams v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,
36 So. (2d) 832 (La. App. 1948).
Ordinarily, a deviation from the statutory form and manner
of giving notice may be a ground for invalidating the administra-
tive decision.3 The jurisdictions which require strict adherence
13. For other cases see Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. v. United States, 263
U.S. 528, 44 S.Ct. 194, 68 L.Ed. 427 (1924); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S.
245, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926).
1. La. Act 185 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §2248]: "It is further
provided that said school bus operator shall be furnished by such school
board at least fifteen days in advance of the date of said hearing, with a
copy of the written grounds on which removal or discharge is sought. Said
school bus operator shall have the right to appear in his own behalf, and
with counsel of his own selection, all of whom shall be heard by the board
at said hearing; provided, further that it is not the intent of this act to
impair the right of appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction."
2. The court did not consider such technical contentions, as when the
fifteen days began to run and the exclusion of certain days in computing
the fifteen days.
3. See People v. Zoller, 337 Ill. 362, 169 N.E. 228 (1929), where the State
of Illinois insisted that if there were any defects in the procedure of giving
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the statutory provisions apparently attempt to restrict the
latitude of administrative bodies on notice procedure to that
which is exercised by courts. Perhaps this is due to the degree
of control exercised by courts over administrative bodies until
the last few decades, since most of the cases adhering to this
view were decided before 1930. 4
The better approach seems to be that an appearance will cure
a defective notice. Currently, the trend appears to be in that
direction-that the number of fatal defects should be reduced
to a minimum, without prejudice to the parties, as such technical
points are detrimental to the efficiency and flexibility of the
administrative process. The purpose of requiring notice of time
and place of hearing is to enable the parties to prepare for trial
and to prevent the rendering of a decision by default, without the
opportunity of being present. If a party appears at a hearing and
is heard, the object of the notice is fulfilled.6 Then why should
one be allowed to take advantage of a defective notice if he has
already received all that was intended to be provided for him
by the notice?
The jurisdictions which narrow the scope of fatal defects of
notice generally require that two conditions be met to constitute
a waiver of notice: that the party appear and actually participate
in the hearing, and that the party not be prejudiced by the non-
compliance with the statutory provisions of notice.7 This is in
line with the principle that if one receives all that was intended
to be provided for him by the notice, he cannot complain because
it was defective. With this principle in mind, to what extent can
courts go in finding a defect in the notice has been waived by
notice, the decision was still valid, because the parties were either present
at the hearing or had been notified by mail of the hearing on that date. The
court held that the failure to post the notice in the proper manner was not
cured by any subsequent acts of the parties. Mathiessen v. Ott, 268 Ill. 569,
109 N.E. 260 (1915); People ex rel. Empie v. Smith, 216 N.Y. 95, 110 N.E.
174 (1915); Zeidl v. Zauner, 247 N.Y. 17, 159 N.E. 707 (1928).
4. See cases cited note 3, supra.
5. Most cases which have held that appearance cures a defective notice
are cases where the owners of property subject to assessments had waived
the right to notice by appearing at the hearing.
6. "The object of the notice . . . is to enable the property owner to pro-
tect his rights by proper proceedings. If he appear in the case, the object of
his notice has been accomplished, nor will he be heard afterwards on that
ground." Barker v. Omaha, 16 Neb. 269, 276, 20 N.W. 382 (1884).
7. See Horstmyer v. Trial Board of Sacrements, 21 Cal. App.(2d) 688, 69
P.(2d) 1021 (1937), where a police officer who was being tried before a city
council argued that the decision dismissing him was void, on the ground
that written notice was not properly served on him as the law required.
The court rejected his argument, stating that he was not prejudiced by the
defective notice, for by his appearance and participation in the proceedings,
he waived the service of notice.
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appearance of the party at the hearing? In the past courts have
limited the cure of a defective notice to an actual appearance
and participation in the hearing.
In this case the court has extended the doctrine of waiver of
notice by an actual appearance and participation in the proceed-
ing to an appearance with counsel in the corridor, adjoining the
hearing room. Because of the peculiar facts in the case, it is be-
lieved that such an extension is justified. First, the parties did
appear, in a sense of the word; and although they did not par-
ticipate in the hearing, they were given full opportunity to do so.
It was their own choice in refusing the request to participate in
the hearing. Second, the alleged non-compliance with the act8
did not prejudice the parties. This was evidenced by the parties
having been present at the proper place, at the correct time, and
with counsel. Their appearance at the hearing with counsel was
precisely the object to be accomplished by the notice.
WILLIAIVI E. ROGERS
ALIMONY-EVIDENCE OF FAULT-AcCRUED PAYMENTS UNDER
SUSPENSIVE APPEAL-In June of 1940, plaintiff husband was
awarded an absolute divorce on the ground of two years volun-
tary separation. The wife reconvened for alimony, and the court,
concluding that the evidence did not warrant a finding that she
had been at fault,' awarded alimony at the rate of five dollars
a week. Plaintiff's evidence, which might have proved that the
parties had never lived together, was ruled inadmissible on the
ground that it was irrelevant in determining the fault issue. From
the alimony judgment, he appealed suspensively. Since neither
litigant sought to have the case removed to the preference docket
until 1947, eight and one-half years passed before the supreme
court heard the case Held, on appeal, the evidence admitted be-
low was inconclusive on the issue of fault and evidence that the
parties had never lived together would have been relevant in
determining this issue. The case was remanded for admission of
the excluded evidence and determination of the fault issue, with
instructions to reinstate the prior judgment if defendant was not
found to have been at fault. Reich v. Grieif, 38 So. (2d) 381 (La.
1949).
8. La. Act 185 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 2248].
1. The defendant wife against whom is pronounced a judgment of divorce
on the grounds of two year separation may be awarded alimony if she was
not at fault in causing the separation. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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